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Liberalizing  vegetable  oil  production  in Indonesia  would  stimu-
late production,  which is already  expanding,  but without  new
milling capacity,  palm oil production  gains are useless. And
increasing  export taxes would  reduce  export revenues.
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In two decades, Indonesia has become the  Removing cumbersome government regula-
world's  second largest producer of palm oil and  tions would stimulate production but would not
coconut oil.  But Indonesia remains a price-  guarantee consumer benefits.
taking producer of perennial (tree) crops in a
market dominated by annual crops, particularly  Whatever scenario is pursued, past invest-
soybeans.  ments in tree crops guarantee rapid expansion of
production.  But increased production does not
Indonesia has expanded production despite a  give producers marketing power as they are
Byzantine collection of price and quantity  unable to adjust supplies as quickly as producers
restrictions that affect both consumers and  of annual crops.
producers.  But the Government of Indonesia
appears ready to liberalize trade and increase  The rapid expansion of vegetable oil produc-
private participation in the sector - recognizing  tion may precipitate a domestic crisis in the
both the limits of government financing and the  palm oil milling industry, as milling capacity is
importance of vegetable oils to the development  stretched.  Should new investments in milling
of the Outer Islands.  fail to materialize, some production gains from
existing trees will be squandered.
Larson simulated the effects of trade liber-
alization on the sector and the effects of an  Should the export tax on vegetable oils
export tax on tax and export revenues.  His pol-  increase, export revenues will drop.  And some
icy simulations show that:  of the gains from tax revenues will be offset by
reduced revenues from state-owned estates.
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I. INTRODUCTION  AND  MOTIVATION
1.  The  tree  crop  sector has  been and  remains a  key  component of  the
Indonesian  economy.  Rubber,  oil palm and coconuts  together  occupy  about  5.5
million  hectares--about  20%  of the  cropped  area in Indonesia,  and generate  20Z
of non-oil export  earnings.  The sector  employs  15% of the labor force,  and
from 1984 to 1986 generated  48,000 new jobs.  The sector  currently  produces
about  16% of agricultural  GNP and is growing  rapidly--especially  oil palm  and
coconuts.  Since 1970,  the area devoted  to coconuts  has increased  76Z,  while
the oil  palm area has expanded by an incredible  432%.  Rapid growth is
forecast  as well.
2.  During  the  period  1980-85,  employment  in agriculture  on Java grew  at
0.9%  p.a., contributing about  24%  of  total employment growth on  Java.
Employment  in off-Java  agriculture  grew at 3.1% p.a. and contributed  nearly
61% of  total employment  growth in the Outer Islands.  Over 60% of the
Indonesian population resides on  Java, and  labor absorption is  a  major
challenge. Rice remains  the  major  agricultural  crop  of Java but  prospects  for
continued  expansion  are pessimistic. Uncultivated  agricultural  land on Java
is virtually  non-existent;  all economically  irrigatable  land is already  being
used and most areas are already planted  with high-yielding  rice varieties.- 2 -
The  World  Bank  has supported  ten  operations  in the  Indonesian  tree  crop sector
with a  lending volume of about  US$ I  billion and considers the  sector
*mportant,  not only for its contribution  to GDP and export  revenue  but also
because of its strategic  role in Outer Island  development. A recent  World
Bank  Staff  Appraisal  Report  (World  Bank,  1988)  concluded  that  "...(T)hroughout
Indonesia,  food crops can  be expected to absorb only limited amounts of
additional  labor,  so the expansion  of agricultural  lands  through  exploitation
of high-value  tree crops  may  be the  only effective  means of generating  growth
and employment  on a large  scale  in the  Outer  Islands."
3.  In September,  1988 the World Bank sent a mission to Indonesia  to
evaluate  the tree crop sector  and provide  recommendations  to the Government
regarding  its future  development. The model  described  in this paper  was  used
to simulate  policy alternatives  for that study.  In addition  to the model
description,  this paper  discusses  the role  of Indonesia  as a producer  of palm
oil  and coconut  oil in a global  context,  provides  a history  of the  sectors  in
Indonesia,  as well as discussing  the impacts  of current  government  policies
and model simulation results of  the removal of existing restrictions  on
domestic  and external  trade in these industries. As well as supporting  the
policy  role  of the  World  Bank in Indonesia,  this study  provides  input  into  the
International  Commodity Markets Division's  ongoing analyses of  the global
outlook  for  the  vegetable  oils  and  meals  industries.-3-
II.  INDONESIA  AND  THE GLOBAL  MARKET
4.  The fats and oils  market  is a highly  integrated  market  characterized
by  substantial substitution possibilities  in  demand  and  diverse supply
sources. The market encompasses  oilseeds such as  soybeans,  rapeseed, and
sunflowerseed,  which are planted  annually;  crops such  as oil palm  and coconut
palm which are perennials;  and animal sources including  butter, tallow  and
lard.  Production  decisions  for  annual  crops  are characterized  by annual  land
allocation  choices  based  on expected  prices  for  meal and oil, while  tree  crop
investment decisions are  similar to  other  long-lived capital investment
decisions.  Animal fats production  is the result of a  set of complicated
investment  decisions involving  the joint  production  of meat, dairy products
and fat by-products.  Fats and oils production  is locationally  diverse  as
well, with a variety of products  produced  and traded throughout  the world.
Table  2.1  conveys a  sense of  the  wide  distribution of  fats and  oils
production.  While North America and  Europe are  the  dominant areas of
production,  large producers are found in South America and Asia as well.
Although  vegetable  oil production  is  growing  rapidly  in Indonesia,  the  country
remains a  relatively  medium-sized  producer  within the total fats and oils
market.
5.  The  model  presented  in  this  paper  is  a model  of Indonesia  independent
of other  markets,  and the  analysis  rests  on the  assumption  that  Indonesia  is  a
price-taker  in  world  markets. While  Table  2.1  shows  that  Indonesia  represents
a small  (3%)  share  of total  fats  and oils  production,  Indonesia  is the  world's-4-
Table 2.1:  1987 PRODUCTION  OF FATS  AND OILS, BY REGION
Region  Production  Share
--Million tons--  --Z__
North America  12.5  17.2
EEC  11.4  15.7
Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R.  9.2  12.7
China  7.4  10.2
Malaysia  5.2  7.2
India  3.9  5.4
Brazil  3.5  4.8
Africa  2.8  3.9
Argentina  2.3  3.2
Indonesia  2.2  3.0
Japan  2.2  3.0
Philippines  1.5  2.1
Mexico  0.9  1.2
Other Europe  0.9  1.2
Turkey  0.8  1.1
Pakistan  0.6  0.8
Australia  0.6  0.8
Rest of the World  4.6  6.0
TOTAL  72.5  100
Source:  Oil World Annual, 1988.-5-
second  largest  producer  of coconut  oil (25%),  and the second  iargest  producer
of palm oil (20%).  Giv-"n  the strong implications  for policy  analysis,  the
alternative  hyothesij thiat  the palm oil and coconut oil markets should  be
considered  somehow  distinct  from the larger  market  for fats  and oils  deserves
consideration.
6.  However, the hypothesis that Indonesia holds price-setting  market
power  in either  the  coconut  oil or palm  oil markets  is rejected  based  on: (1)
the known technical  substitution  possibilities  among vegetable  oils (2) the
strong statistical  evidence of price correlation  among oils with varying
supply  conditions;  (3)  the inability  of tree-crop  vegetable  oil production  to
expand  or contract  rapidly;  and (4)  the results  of simulations  of production
shift  effects  in the context  of a global  model.  The full  arguments  are  given
in  Appendix  A.-6-
III.  HISTORICAL  SETTING
7.  Although  considered a  "new"  crop  in  Indonesia, palm  oil  was
cultivated  acid  used for soap production  in Central  Java by the  mid-nineteenth
century  and oil palm plantations  producing  edible  oil appeared  in Sumatra  by
1911.  In 1938 about 90,000 hectares  were planted in oil.  palm, but during
World War II and the following  years of early independence  little growth
occurred  in m3ct of the estate  crops.  In 1968,  all  nationalized  former-Dutch
estates  were reorganized  into  28 independent  management  units (PNPs/PTPs),  I/
and all other nationalized  estates  were returned  to their previous  owners.
Expansion  and rehabilitation  plans  were launched  and  new planting  begun.  Oil
palm  was considered  more profitable  than many of the other  estate  crops,  and
areas devoted to oil palm expanded  rapidly.  Areas planted in palm oil on
government-owned  estates  grew from  84,000  hectares  in 1969  to 176,000  hectares
in 1979 and to 343,000  hectares  in 1987 (Table  3.1).  Large private  estates
expanded  rapidly  as well,  growing  from  35,000  hectares  in  1969  to over 146,000
hectares in  1987.  In addition to  direct inveitment in oil  palm, the
Indonesian  Government  also sponsored  small-holder  development  in oil palm.
Lands  have been  cleared  and  planted  near existing  PTPs  where  small  holders  (2-
4 hectares  each) care for  and harvest  the trees.  The crop is processed  into
Crude  Palm  Oil  (CPO)  at  the  PTP's  crushing  plant.  These  "people's
plantations"  are  currently  the  most rapidly  expanding  type  of cultivation
1/  PTPs (Perseroan  Terbatas  Perkebunan)  and  PNPs (Perusahaan  Negasa
Perkebunan)  are  both  state  owned  estates. The  PTPs  have  more  limited
liability  under  Indonesian  law.Table  3.1:  INDONESIAN  PALM  OIL  PROOUCTION
------------ Production  (tons)  -----------  ------- Harvested  Area  (hectares)---------
Small  State  Private  Small  State  Pr;vate
Date  Holders  Estates  Estates  Holders  Estates  Estates
1970  0  147,003  69,824  0  86,640  46.658
1971  0  170,304  79,653  0  91,153  47,950
!972  0  189,261  80,203  0  96,562  55,497
1973  0  207,448  82,229  0  98,033  59,747
1974  0  243,641  104,035  0  117,513  64,223
1975  0  271,171  126,082  0  120,940  67,885
1976  0  286,096  144,910  0  141,333  69,772
1977  0  336,891  120,716  0  148,775  71,626
1978  0  336,224  165,060  0  163,465  68,651
1979  760  438,756  201,724  3,125  176,408  81,406
1980  720  498,908  221,544  6,175  199,338  89,047
1981  1,045  533,399  265,616  5,695  213,264  100,008
1982  2,955  598,653  285,212  8,537  224,440  96,924
1983  3,4x4  710,430  269,102  37,043  261,339  107,624
1984  4,031  814,015  329,144  40,552  340,511  130,958
1985  36,216  867,973  339,241  118,564  335,185  143,603
1986  53,504  912,306  384,919  129,904  332,694  144,182
1987  66,664  1,025,882  384,919  218,510  342,725  146,671
Source: Directcr  General  of  Estates,  Indonesia.- 8 -
unit.  Non-existent  in 1978,  small-holder  area in 1987 (at  218,000  hectares)
exceeded  that  of  large  private  plantations.  Palm  oil  production  has  expanded
rapidly  as well, with government  estates  again dominating  the sector.
Production  on government  estates grew from 129,000 tons in 1969 to 1.026
million  tons in 1°97.  The large  private  estates  produced  over 60,000  tons in
1969 and 385,000  tons in 1987.  Small-holder  production  is  ly beginning  to
come on-stream,  yet 1987 production  is estimated  at 67,000  ;as.  Government-
sponsored  palm oil production,  either directly  or indirectly  through small
holders,  's  therefore responsible  for  about 74Z  of  total production in
Indonesia.
8.  Cultivation  of coconut  trees  in  Indonesia  is  dramatically  different
in scale from the  cultivation  of oil palm.  Fresh fruit  bunches  of oil palm
must be processed  quickly  after harvesting  and crushing  plants  are typically
built at the hub of an estate  extending  over 5,000  hectares.  Ninety-eight
percent  of the area planted  to coconuts  in Indonesia  is cultivated  by small-
holders,  typically  in groves  of less  than  two  hectares  (Table  3.2).  The total
coconut area has grown consistently,  however, increasing  from 1.2 million
hectares  in  1970  to 3.2  million  hectares  in 1987  (Table  3.2).
9.  Of the 3.2 million hectares, 3.1 million hectares are managed by
small-holders  with little  c( no government  support.  Government  ownership  is
extremely limited at 14,000 hectares, and large estares account for only
42,000  hectares. Despite  the  availability  of new, high-yielding  varieties  of
palm, yields have remained stable  and low at around 0.6 tons per hectare
(copra  equivalent)--suggesting  that  the  maturity  and  varietal  composition  ofTable  3.2:  INDONESIAN  COCONUT  PROO(JCTION
------- Production  (tons  copra  Eq.)-------  ------- Harvested  Area  (hectares)-------
Small  State  Private  Small  State  Private
Date  Holders  Estates  Estates  Holders  Estates  Esta.s
1970  1,198,863  1,749  2,290  1,789,262  5,928  10,541
1971  1,273,935  2,068  3,576  1,870,564  6,453  11,180
1972  1,248,739  3,007  4,205  1,889,682  6,982  11,556
1973  1,274,441  1,626  3,859  1,989,618  6,969  12,^S
1974  1,335,441  1,495  6,475  2,108,591  6,691  15,2r
1975  1,380,929  3,495  5,545  2,193,097  7,694  16,274
1976  1,526,577  3,253  4,811  2,304,790  9,243  14,800
1977  1,541,996  3,320  21,231  2,393,112  10,182  58,072
1978  1,553,763  3,527  20,952  2,454,115  9,234  42,212
1979  1,596,191  3,612  22,284  2,520,938  10,405  48,230
1980  1,629,726  3,701  32,646  2,622,206  15,050  43,167
1981  1,764,567  3,887  24,468  2,752,386  15,075  57,401
1982  1,587,177  4,457  11,411  2,808,989  13,411  29,764
1983  1,590,173  3,443  14,022  2,890,681  16,683  39,346
1984  1,737,263  2,430  10,795  2,958,170  14,197  39,113
1985  1,905,241  4,147  11,043  2,993,442  14,642  40,916
1986  1,950,290  7,628  16,724  3,056,575  14,271  41,682
1987  1,984,522  7,628  16,724  3,119,295  14,291  41,682
Source: Director  General  of Estates,  Indonesia.- 10  -
the tree stock has remained  fairly  constant  over the last two decades.  The
steady  expansion  of coconut  trees in Indonesia  appears  to have a life of its
own.  A simple  linear  trend  which  mimics  population  growth,  explains  over 99%
of the expansion in coconut  area over this period,  leaving  little  room for
relative price impacts on  investment.  However, coconut production from
planted areas does respond to changes in real prices through harvesting
intensification,  as  will be shown  in the  model  discussion.
10.  The  stability of yields and  the  failure to adopt high-yielding
varieties of  coconut palm  in  Indonesia remains somewhat of  a  mystery.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the most prolific of the high-yielding
varieties,  the dwarf hybrid,  is unpopular  since  the nuts are smaller  and  the
shorter  trees cannot  be easily  intercropped. However,  other tall varieties
are  available which  produce yields significantly  higher  than  varieties
presently  in use, and yet thes-s  have not been adopted  either.  It has also
been convincingly  argued  that farmers  are reluctant  to cut down palm trees
that are yielding  any nuts--even  when thosE trees are well over 60 years
old.  Yet, every year, 30-60 thousand  hectares  of new land are planted  in
coconuts. Therefore, a  large number of  trees have been planted and  .iave
matured  during  the  past two decades  of stable  yields. A third  argument  which
seems  reasonable,  is that because  of the long  gestation  period  and long life
of coconut trees the "demonstration  effect" of the new varieties  is quite
slow.  Unlike  annual  crops,  in which  results  are demonstrated  each  year,  the
results from planting tree crops are mucx.  delayed.  While demonstration
effects  grow geometrically,  the four to seven  year  wait between  "generations"
of  effects is  likely to  slow substantially  the full impact of the new- 11 -
technology.  In addition, technologically  progressive  farmers who do plant
improved  varieties of coconut reap the benefits  four to seven years after
planting,  but may suffer a loss in the early years due to increased  input
requirements  and outlays for planting  material.  If future  income  is highly
discounted,  as is likely  the  case  among  small-holders,  these  up-front  expenses
are  a strong  disincentive.
11.  While  the total supply of coconuts does not  seem responsive  to
economic  variables,  the allocation  of nuts to the copra industry  does seem
responsive  to price  and income  movements.  In 1970,  47% of the total  coconut
production  was crushed  as copra  to produce  meal and oil.  As prices  jumped  in
the  mid-1970s,  more than  63%  of production  moved  into  the  formal  copra  milling
sector.  This  share dropped  as prices  fell  in 1985 and 1986, but with the
sharp price increase in 1987 the  share increased again to about 60% of
production.- 12 -
IV. DOMESTIC  KARKLqING  AND GOVERNMENT  POLICY
12.  The  composition  of the  domestic  market  for  coconut  oil  (CCO)  and  palm
oil  has changed  dramatically  over  the  past  two  decades. In 1971,  93%  of total
expenditures  on crude vegetable  oil were devoted  to coconut  oil (see  Table
4.1).  Domestic  use  of coconut  oil  was  greater  than  373,000  tons,  while  of the
250,000  tons of palm oil produced  in Indonesia,  only 24,000  tons were used
locally.  As the decade  progressed,  palm oil's  market  share  grew steadily--
reaching  about 24% of expenditures  in 1980.  Over the past eight years,
however,  domestic use of palm oil has expanded  even more rapidly  and is
currently  about  40%  of  domestic  expenditures.  In physical  terms,  domestic  use
of palm oil  now exceeds  that  of coconut  oil.  In 1987  domestic  use  of  coconut
oil  dropped  to  605,000  tons  (from  750,000  tons  in 1986),  while  domestic  demand
for  palm oil grew from  601,000  tons  to 757,000  tons.  The  motivation  for  the
substitution  of palm  oil for  coconut  oil is  easy  to understand.  Palm  oil  has
historically  had  a discount  to coconut  oil  on international  markets,  yet  both
crude  oils are  essentially  equivalent  as inputs  for  a variety  of uses. It is
possible  to manufacture  refined  cooking  oils from each which  have no taste
differences;  margarine  and  shortening  can  be  made  from  both  products;  both  can
be used to add fat  content  to dairy  products  made from  dried  milk;  and both
can  be used  for  some  types  of soap. But  to fully  understand  the  timing  of the
substitution,  and  its  potential  impact  on  market  prospects,  it  is important  to
understand  the  domestic  marketing  environment  for  vegetable  oils  in Indonesia.- 13  -
Table  4.1:  INDONESIAN  CONSUMPTION  OF VEGETABLE  OILS
Share  of Vegetable
Oil  Expenditure
Year  Coconut  Oil  Palm  oil  for  Palm  Oil
…------('000  tons)-------  ------- (Z)--
1971  373  24  3
1975  500  48  9
1980  629  232  24
1985  562  769  43
1987  605  757  40
13.  The  Government  of Indonesia  jointly  pursues  a variety  of policy  goals
with respect  to the vegetable  oils market.  Cooking  oil is one of the nine
commodities  which  the  government has  designated as  "essential"  and  the
provision  of cooking oil at a price consumers  can "afford"  has been a key
objective  of government  policies.  However,  the government  is also committed
to providing  a "fair"  price to producers,  and insuring  an adequate  supply  of
raw  vegetable oil  to  processors.  At  the  same time, the government is
committed to protecting  the processing  industry  as well as to increasing
export  revenue  generated  by the vegetable  oil sector.  These  objectives  are
difficult to  pursue simultaneously  and  are often at odds, leading to a
proliferation  of market intervention  policies--including  both quantity and
price  restrictions,  a central  marketing  organization,  and tax  policies.- 14  -
14.  In order  to insure  adequate  supplies  of raw  material  for  the  domestic
industry, representatives  of  the  Ministries of  Trade, Agriculture, and
Industry  convene  each year to allocate  a portion  of CPO production  to each of
the major competing  industrial  users--including  fractionation  (breaking  the
original  oil  into  component  fatty-acids) and  refining, margarine and
shortening  production,  soap production,  chemical  uses, and animal  feed.  In
addition,  in  order  to  keep  prices  stable  and  to  ensure  processing
profitability,  an  official "allocation price" is  designated.  With  the
exception  of 1986  when palm  oil prices  hit an historic  low,  allocation  prices
have fallen  below world prices (Table  4.2).  Plantations  owned  by the state
and by joint-foreign  ventures  are obligated to provide a portion  of their
production to  a  Joint  Marketing Organization (JMO)  which  handles  the
implementation  of the  allocation  scheme.
15.  Since coconut production is  so widely diversified, there is no
equivalent  allocation  scheme  for coconuts  (although  there  have been a number
of local laws and taxes which discourage  inter-island  transport  of either
fresh  nuts or copra).  However,  to ensure  adequate  supplies  of all vegetable
oils,  quantitative  and licensing  export  restrictions  apply  to both crude  palm
and coconut  oil.  Historically,  government  approval  for coconut  oil or copra
exports has been rare.  Earlier,  coconut  oil was devoted first to meeting
domestic  demand  with palm oil used to supplement,  but not displace,  domestic
coconut oil  demand.  More  recently, as  palm oil  has gained increasing
acceptance  as a less-expensive  alternative  in cooking  oil, the government  has
allowed  increasing  exports  of coconut  oil.  Copra  exports  are still  rare, in
order  to provide  protection  to domestic  crushers. Until  recently,  imports  of- 15 -
Table  4.2: PRICES  OF PALM  OIL
(Rp  '000/ton)
Official
Year  Allocation  Price  Rotterdam  Price
1970  90  94
1971  90  103
1972  100  90
1973  120  157
1974  120  278
1975  120  180
1976  120  168
1977  120  220
1978  175  265
1979  210  407
1980  220  367
1981  260  360
1982  260  294
1983  295  455
1984  295  748
1985  425  556
1986  400  346
1987  425  562
Source: World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.- 16 -
palm  oil,  coconut  oil,  and  copra  were forbidden, providing protection to
farmers.  Exports, which are  licensed, are  subject to a  two-tiered tax
system.  There is a fixed tax of 0-5X and an additional  variable  "special"
tax,  intended to  make  up  the  dirference between domestic prices  and
international  prices.  As  the domestic price is fixed, and international
prices  fluctuate  daily,  the special  tax  often  fails  to bridge  the  gap  between
domestic  and international  prices,  creating  numerous  incentives  to circumvent
the  tax  and  the  physical  trade  restrictions.
16.  As mentioned  earlier,  the government  either  directly,  or indirectly
through  its sponsorship  of small holders,  produces  most of the palm oil in
Indonesia. As a result,  the government  has in the past  encouraged  production
growth through direct investment in the  sector.  In addition, domestic
production  has been stimulated  by other  programs. Many of the  best  potential
sites for palm development  are in areas of Sumatra  and Kalimantan  for  which
property  rights are allocated  by local custom rather than by strict  legal
deed.  At the same time,  Indonesian  oil palm  plantations  are typically  built
on a scale involving  5,000 hectares  or more.  Investors  without sufficient
knowledge of  local conditions are  unable to  amass sufficient tracts of
contiguous  land.
17.  Current  programs  often  offer  investors  access  to large  tracts  of land
deeded to  the  central or  local governments, circumventing the need  to
negotiate  land-use  rights  with multiple  (often  contending)  parties. Loans  at
subsidized rates  are  also  included, greatly  increasing already  strong
investment  incentives. In addition,  the  government  often provides  roads  and- 17  -
other  forms  of infrastructure.  Fertilizer  prices  are subaiidized  in Indonesia
as well, decreasing  operating  costs and increasing  profit margins for the
plantations.  At the same time, however,  complicated  government  allocation
rules  and high  processing  costs  provide  contradictory  disincentives.
18.  The  net effect of government policies with respect to palm and
coconut  oil are mixed for producers,  but more clear for consumers.  For the
consumer,  despite  policies  which  tend to reduce  the price  of crude  oil  inputs
to processors,  potential  consumer  savings  are limited  by concentration  in the
processing  sector  and restrictive  licensing  of imports.  Empirical  evidence
would indicate  that cooking oil prices in Indonesia  have been higher than
world  prices  (Table  4.3).  In  only seven  of the  55 months  covered  in  Table  4.3
was cooking oil produced from palm oil  in Indonesia less expensive than
cooking  oil produced  from  palm  oil in  Europe. In only 16  of the  55  months  was
the price  of coconut  oil produced  in Indonesia  less  than the  price  of refined
coconut  oil in  Europe. In the  first  seven  months  of 1988,  Jakarta  cooking  oil
prices were  23%  above an  equivalent export parity price.  Despite the
decontrol  of prices of olein, stearin  and refined coconut oil in December
1987,  cooking  oil prices  have not returned  to international  levels. In July
of 1988,  RBD stearin  in Medan sold  for 748  Rp/Kg compared  to an f.o.b.  price
of 680  Rp/Kg.
19.  For the  producer,  the  allocation  responsibilities  imposed  on oil  palm
plantations  result  in a net  decrease  in  producer  revenue  as do restrictions  on
exports  of copra,  coconut  oil  and  palm  oil.  Export  taxes  further  increase  the
wedge  between  world  and  domestic  prices. At the  same  time,  given  the  rapid- 18  -
Table 4.3:  A COMPARISON  OF INDONESIAN  AND ROTTERDAM COOKING OIL PRICES
Cooking Oil from CPO  Cooking Oil from CCO
Year/  Jakarta  Rotterdam  Jakarta  Rotterdam
Month  (Rp/Kg)  (Rp/Kg)  S  (I  )/(2)  (RA/Kg  (Rp/Kg)  S (1)/(2)
1984
I  1,007  1,041  97  1,071  1,097  98
2  867  1,057  82  938  1,188  79
3  840  864  97  963  1,152  84
4  860  873  98  1,052  1,180  89
5  771  975  79  1,044  1,348  77
6  750  500  94  1,027  1,468  70
7  750  647  116  997  1,306  76
8  750  672  112  971  1,107  88
9  750  675  III  848  1,200  71
10  750  694  108  807  1,206  67
11  750  7111  105  804  1,019  79
12  750  672  112  798  944  85
1985
1  731  698  105  777  951  82
2  725  675  107  775  840  92
3  744  725  103  838  937  89
4  770  829  93  850  854  99
5  767  765  100  786  735  107
6  750  681  110  740  639  116
7  720  572  126  723  578  125
8  574  511  112  577  507  114
9  588  457  129  605  474  128
10  547  411  133  575  478  120
11  512  428  120  541  442  122
i2  605  480  126  584  439  133
1986
1  637  424  150  687  431  159
2  624  374  167  623  361  173
3  592  345  172  588  332  177
4  539  372  145  554  302  184
5  511  369  139  556  264  210
6  479  378  127  533  288  185
7  480  293  164  525  249  210
8  585  318  184  599  239  250
9  612  455  134  626  395  159
10  653  567  115  717  707  101
11  774  631  123  867  646  134
12  707  572  124  b16  649  126- 19  -
Table  4.3: A COMPARISON  OF INDONESIAN  AND  ROTTERDAM  COOKING  OIL  PRICES  (Covtinued)
Cooking  Oil  from  CPO  Cooking  Oil from  CCO
Year/  Jakarta  Rotterdam  Jakarta  Rotierdam
Month  (RpA/g)  (Rp/Kg)  % (1)/(2)  (Rp/Kg  (Rp/Ag)  S  (I  )/(2)
1987
1  728  651  112  826  699  118
2  768  653  118  862  663  130
3  744  615  121  82"  566  147
4  707  620  114  780  640  122
5  700  615  114  778  666  117
6  713  628  114  840  741  113
7  681  577  118  789  728  108
8  650  612  106  791  787  100
9  679  641  106  842  789  107
10  698  638  109  833  561  149
II  707  671  105  818  638  128
12  822  781  105  899  666  135
1988
1  968  957  101  1,054  962  110
2  880  819  107  975  901  108
3  783  731  107  918  877  105
4  781  750  104  934  865  108
5  791  772  102  961  906  106
6  917  887  103  1,080  1,044  103
7  945  872  108  1,144  1,132  101
Note: Exchange  rates  used  to  convert  world  merket  prices  to  rupiah  equivalents  are  annual  average  market
exchange  rates:
1984  US$I.OO  =  Rp. 1,026
1985  USSI.00  =  Rp.  1,111
1986  USS1.00  = Rp. 1,134
1986  (post  September) US$1.00  = Rp. 1,644
1987  US$1.00  = Rp. 1,644
1988  USSI.OO  = Rp. 1,700
World  Bank  Prices  are  Cif  Rotterdam  as  reported  in  Oil  World. Domestic  prices  are  quotations  from  the
Department  of  Trade  reported  monthly.- 20  -
expansion  of both oil palm and coconut,  it is hard to argue that the net
incentives for  investment  are  not  positive. Access  to large  areas  of land  as
well as subsidized  investment  capital  are strong incentives,  and investment
has been and is likely  to remain  strong,  especially  in oil palm plantations.
Given the inability  of the allocation  procedures  to lower  domestic  consumer
prices,  despite  lowering  farm  gate prices,  it  must  be assumed  that  most of the
benefits of  the  current  system  of  marketing fall  to  processors and
distributors.  This segment of the market already enjoys some measure of
protection due  to  low  labor and  transportation  costs  because of  their
proximity  to raw inputs  such  as CPO  and copra.- 21 -
V.  FUTURE  GOVERNMENT  POLICIES  IN PALM  OIL
20.  As noted earlier,  the government  of Indonesia  has played  an active
role in the palm  oil sector  through  direct  investments  via PTPs,  small-holder
programs,  and the private  sector  incentives. During  the next five-year  plan
(Repelita  V) which  begins  in 1989,  direct  government  investments  are likely  to
remain  small  as low petroleum  prices  have limited  governmint  re-:enues.  As a
result,  the government  has initiated  an alternative  investment  program  which
emphasizes  private  investment  and  management  spurred  by government  incentives.
The program, Pir-Trans,  contains elements which have appeared in earlier
programs  but is unique  in that it assigns  small-holder  development  assistance
responsibilities  to private sector  investors--a  role traditionally  reserved
for  state-owned  estates. Under  Pir-Trans,  the  government  would  be responsible
for infrastructure  development  such as roads,  bridges,  and electricity. The
government  would also facilitate  the acquisition  of property-use  rights,  an
obstacle which has greatly limited private investment  in the past.  Land
clearing would be handled by contractors,  oftea in exchange for logging
rights.  Private  investors  would  have access  to credit  at concessionary  rates
and  would finance  estate  development,  new crop planting  and palm oil  crushing
facilities.  Around  this privately-managed  center  or nucleus,  an area up to
four-times  as large  would  be devoted  to small-holder  development. Government
resources  would be used to finance small-holder  plantings,  initial living
expenses and  housing.  The  nucleus would  be  responsible  for  providing
extension services,  collecting  harvested fruit bunches,  and processing  the
bunches  into  crude  palm  oil.- 22 -
21.  As we will see, assumptions  concerning  the success  of Pir-Trans in
continuing  what  has  been rapid  investment  in the  palm  oil  sector  are important
to the latter  part of the projection  period  to the  year 2000.  Investment  in
new plantings  during  Repelita  V will have  negligible  impact  through  the  end  of
the plan in 1994,  but, if sufficiently  large,  could  prove important  for the
last six  years  of the  projection  period.
22.  Generally  speaking,  the Pir-Trans  program  is open to all tree crops;
however,  to date,  the  private  sector  has  limited  its  interest  to palm  oil  with
the exception  of a single  cocoa  project  on Kalimantan. As of October,  1988
projects  involving  over 376,000 hectares  had been approved  by the Director
General  of Estates  under the Pir-Trans  program  for  development  through  1994.
Another 124,000  hectares  were under consideration  at that time.  Tables  5.1
and 5.2  give a listing  of these  projects  by implementation  data.  The  numbers
given in the tables  do not include  the expansion  of existing  private  estates,
nor do they include  private  investment  outside  of the Pir-Trans  program  (for
example,  plantings  on private  estates owned by nationals  which are eligible
for other credit programs.)  Adding in new are. from other sources  to the
Pir-Trans  schedule  would  bring total  new area investment  to 75-80,000
hectares  annually,  a large  area even by the standards  of recent  years. There
are several  reasons  why this schedule  may be overly  optimistic. Over 7CZ  of
the area under Pir-Trans  as it stood in October, 1988 would be devoted to
small holders  which would be 100Z government-financed. In addition,  roads,
housing,  and other  facilities  would have to be constructed  at an unparalleled
rate, placing an  extremely heavy burden on a  government with  dwindling
revenues  for  investment. Also,  as can  be seen  in  Tables 5.1-5.2,  most ofTable 5.1:  APPEDOW  PIR-TRANE  Projects  by Provire
Total  Total  Total
ReIita  IV  Repelta  Pepellta  V  Repelita  ta  VI  Repelita Toka1  PFtgrazi  1S85/86  1986/87  1987/88  I  9i8/89  IV  1989/90  1990/91  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  V  19495  .995/96  VI
A. Private  Sector
1.  RII  Wdl  55,320  0  0  3,020  9,500  12,520  13,000  13,00  U1,500  10,300  5,oco  52,800  0  0  0
N.leus  16,330  0  0  1,000  2,380  3,380  2,850  4,250  3,150  1,700  1,00)  12,950  0  0  0
2.  JMBI  StIxl  75,840  0  0  0  500  500  9,540  16,400  17,400  17,600  9,200  70,140  2,800  2,4D0  5,200
?aleus  26,460  0  0  0  2,000  2,000  4,710  5,600  6,100  3,300  3,550  23,260  6(0  600  1,200
3.  SUM1D  96M1  17,00  0  0  0  1,200  1,200  2,0OO  3,300  4,500  3,OOD  3,000  15,800  0  0  0
SELAAN  M,cla  8,o  o  0  0  0  300  300  50  1,20  2,00  2,000  2,O  7,700  0  0  0
4.  S143EA  9tSdl 6,000  0  0  0  500  500  1,ooo  1,500  1,500  1,500  0  5,500  0  0  0
BARAT  Nclae  4,000  0  0  0  2,0O0  2,sOO  2,OD0  0  0  0  0  2,000  0  0  0
5.  KAAIAN  S9dl  35,300  0  0  0  0  0  500  7,200  8,100  10,000  9,500  35,300  0  0  0 BARAT  ticleus  16,700  0  0  0  500  500  1,500  6,200  6,200  1,300  1,000  16,200  0  0  0
6.  KUANEAN  Reii  8,oco  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,200  2,400  3,200  1,200  8,10D  0  0  0 Tam  ieus2  20D  0  0  0  0  0  0  300  60D  830  300  2,0DO  0  0  0
7. KALDIrA  Sia  3,00X  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,500  1,500  0  0  3,00D  0  0  o TDMR  *  xileus  750  0  0  0  0  0  0  750  0  0  0  750  0  0  0
SU.Ak1  SWd  8,001  0  0  1,200  2,000  3,200  2,800  2,0  0  0  0  4,8oO  0  0 O
SE"N  N  2,000  0  0  350  500  800  700  500  0  0  0  1,200  0  0  0
9.  6SU13A1  9dxl  6,000  0  0  0  0  0  1,00)  2,0D0  3,000  0  0  6,0SO  0  0  0 TDA  t&e,s 
4
,000  0  0  0  0  0  2,OOD  2,0D0  0  0  0  4,050  0  0  0
T1L  A:  SWi1  224,460  0  0  4,220  13,700  17,920  29,840  48,100  49,900  45,600  27,900  201,340  2,800  2,400  5,200
Nacle  80,240  0  0  1,300  7,680  8,960  14,260  20,830  18,050  9,100  7,850  70,060  600  60)  1,200
B.  INDl PFT.
(PIP')
1.  3  ERA  Pl  9,300  0  0  0  0  0  1,200  2,000  2,000  2,000  2,100  9,300  0  0  0
ULARA  irti6,20D  6,20D  0  0  0  6,200  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
2.  RIL  Pau  12,000  500  5,500  0  3,50  9,500  2,500  0  0  0  0  2,500  0  0  0
IrtA  8.000  3,500  0  0  2,ooo  5,500  1,500  1,000  0  0  0  2,500  0  0  0
3.  JAN1  Plasu  16,000  0  5,500  0  4,000  9,500  4,000  2,500  0  0  0  6,500  0  0  0
iti  4,s00  0  2,000  0  0  2,0ao  0  2,OOD  0  0  0  2,OO)  0  0  0
4.  SJSA1  Pl_  12,000  0  0  0  0  0  0  2,500  3,000  3,500  3,0DO  12,000  0  0  0
1JAMAN  Inti  3,000  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,000  1,000  1,000  0  3,000  0  0  0 5. KAULIN  PiA  4,50D  0  0  0  750  750  750  750  750  750  750  3,75D  0  0  0 BART  bti  3,000  1,198  1,802  0  0  3,0C0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
TIrAL B:  Pin  53,800  50D  11,ODO  0  8,250  19,750  8,450  7,750  5,750  6,250  5,850  0  0  0  0 nti  24,200  10,898  3,8M2  0  2,OOD  16,700  1,500  4,OOD  1,000  I,OD  0  7,500  0  0  0
TU0AL  A  IND  B:  PIau  278,260  500  11,000  4,220  21,950  37,670  38,290  55,850  55,650  51,850  33,750  253,390  2,800  2,400  5,200 Intl  104,440  10,898  3,8D2  1,300  9,680  25,660  15,760  24,80D  19,050  10,100  7,850  77,560  600  60D  1,200
Scur:  Diz  GIml  of  Fatates,  1988.Table 5.2:  APLICATE  Ct PR]W1  Lr8  PIP-A  (HR3TNM)
Total  Total  Total
Pepeitta  IV  Repelita  Repe  VR  lita  VRemelta  VI  Repelita Total PtErwa  1985/86  1986/87  I987/88  1988/89  IV  1989/90  199D/91  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  V  1994/9  1995/96  VI.
1.  APPE
A. INn  SS  9Rdl  224,460  0  0  4,220  13,700  17,920  29,840  41,100  49,900  45,600  27,900  201,340  2,8D0  2,400  5,200 (Private)  lixIle  8D,240  0  0  1,30D  7,68D  8,980  14,260  20,8W  18,050  9,100  7,850  70,0W0  600  600  1,200 a.  iNn  PT.  Pis  53,80D  500  U,000  4,220  21,950  37,670  8,450  7,750  5,750  6,250  5,850  34,050  0  0  0 PfJlW  Intl  24,2W0  10,898  3,832  1,3W0  9,680  25,680  1,5W0  4,00W  1,0W  1,0W  0  7,5W  0  0  0 (PIP)
ITL  I:  Pl  278,260  500  UL,C0W  8,40  35,650  55,590  38,9  55,850  55,650  51,850  33,750  233,390  2,8W0  2,4W  5,2m Intl  104,440  10,898  3,832  2,60D  17,360  34,660  15,760  24,800  19,050  10,100  7,850  77,560  6W0  600  1,2w
11.  PXZDPO
A.  Dn  SWIM  aSod 87,0oo  0  0  0  0  0  0  7,000  17,0WO  21,5w  22,500  68,00W  16,00W  3,0WD  19,OOD (Private)  Nucleus 53,0W  0  0  0  0  0  0  4,500  11,250  15,250  15,5W0  46,500  6,0D  0  6,000 B.  in  Pr.  Plas.  6,0D  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,0W  1,5W0  1,5W  1,500  5,5W0  5W  0  SOO PFU2(N  Intl  4,0W0  0  0  0  0  0  0  500  1,0WD  1,0WD  1,0W0  3500  500  0  500
(PIP)
1UrAL  11:  Pla.  93,0W0  0  0  0  0  0  0  8,000  18,500  23,00  24,0OO  73,500  16,500  3,(00  19,500 Intl  57,00W  0  0  0  0  0  0  5,0W0  12,250  16,250  16,500  50,0WO  6,500  0  6,500
TUiAL  I  AND  11:  Pleas  371,260  50W  11,00D  8,440  35,650  55.590  38,290  63,850  74,150  74,850  57,750  308,890  19,300  5,40W  24,700 Inl  161,440  10,898  3,802  2,600  17,360  34,660  15,760  29,800  31,300  26,350  24,350  127,560  7,100  600  7,700
Source:  Direaor  Gwwral of  Fatates,  DM
5or:  Diretor  Gsel  oE Ftee,  198- 25 -
the  projects are located  in  areas  without large  local  populations  readily
available  to fill the need for construction  workers,  plantation  workers,  and
later small-holders.  In recent  years,  most of the investment  in oil palm
plantations  has occured  in Sumatra.  Under the Pir-Trans  program  this would
continue  with a 60%  of the investment  appearing  around  Riau  and Jambi  (an  area
located  in the  central-western  portion  of Sumatra).  Development  in these  areas
should  move more rapidly  as some  of the existing  infrastructure  is in place.
However, opening up new areas in Sulawesi and especially  Kalimantan  will
require  substantial  upfront  investment  in infrastructure,  which  will take  some
time  to complete.
23.  In order to project  production  beyond  1995,  an assumption  had to be
made as to the impact  of Pir-Trans. The private  sector  in Indonesia,  though
leery about  small-holder  development responsibilities,  appears genuinely
interested  in the early stages of Pir-Trans--especially  since the program
facilitates  the  acquisition  of property  use rights. In addition,  with private
sector costs for palm oil at  less than $220 per ton, and world market
prospects  near $400 per ton, most projects  appear  very profitable  even when
producers  receive  less  than  world  market  prices. At the  same  time,  government
obligations  under the program  appear  quite burdensome  and it is likely  that
the  anticipated  expansion  of  the  proportionately larger  small-holder
development  aspects of  the program will require more time than has been
allocated.  Taking  this into account,  it is assumed  that total  investment  in
new oil palm areas will continue to expand quite rapidly,  averaging  about
50,000  hectares  annually.- 26  -
VI.  INDONESIAN  MODEL  DESCRIPTION
Demand
24.  While  production  changes  in Indonesia  have a limited  effect  on  global
prices,  the  domestic  market  within  Indonesia  does react  dynamically  to world
and  domestic events and  policies.  In order to quantify the effects of
possible  policy  alternatives  for Indonesia,  a small  econometric  model of the
sector  was estimated. The remainder  of the paper  is devoted  to a description
of the model and a discussion  of projections  under several scenarios.  The
model  consists of  24  equations which  simultaneously  determine palm oil
production,  the production  of coconuts,  coconut  crushing,  fresh  coconut  use,
coconut  oil  production,  total  expenditures  for  vegetable  oils  and the  share  of
expenditures  devoted  to palm oil and coconut  oil, as well as the export  of
palm  oil and coconut  oil.  While  the detailed  model specification  is  given  in
Annex  C, the  main  components  of the  model  are  explained  below.
25.  The  demand  for  vegetable oils  is  modeled  using  Deaton  and
Muellbauer's  (1980)  Almost  Ideal  Demand  System  which is a two-stage  budgeting
model of consumer  demand  (see  Annex  B).  Total  expenditure  per capita  devoted
to vegetable  oils  is determined  in the first stage as a function  of total
income  (private consumption levels) per  capita, an  aggregate index of
vegetable oil  prices, and  the  price of  rice (the major  food staple in
Indonesia). All prices  are deflated  by the Indonesian  Consumer  Price  Index.
Expenditure  share  equations  are specified  as a function  of relative  prices  of- 27 -
coconut  oil  and palm  oil  and  total  vegetable  oil  expenditures--all  deflated  by
an endogenously-determined  index  of vegetable  oil prices. The shares  are then
applied  to the  first-stage  expenditure  level,  and  multiplied  by population  to
derive  domestic  demand  for  coconut  oil  and  palm  oil.
26.  Table  6.1  provides  the  second-stage  compensated  price  and  expenditure
elasticities  for palm oil and vegetable oil for the years 1970, 1980 and
1985.  The results  from  two different  specifications  are presented. Both  are
fully  constrained  to meet  the theoretical  restrictions.  However,  vne  system  is
specified  in terms  of Manser's  (1976)  habit-formation  model  while  the  other  is
specified  without  lagged  variables.
27.  The results from the two models are quite similar.  In the early
years  of the  sample  period,  when coconut  oil dominated  domestic  vegetable  oil
consumption,  coconut oil demand remained relatively  price and expenditure
inelastic. With  domestic  demand  initially  at very low  levels,  the  percentage
responses  of palm  oil consumption  to income  and price  changes  were large. As
palm oil consumption  grew, expenditure  elasticities  remained  low for coconut
oil, although the price responsiveness  increased.  The income  and price of
palm  oil  fell  while  the  cross-price elasticities remained steady and
relatively  large.  1/
1/  The time-paths  which  the income  elasticities  of vegetable  oils  exhibit  are
quite  normal  for  food items  which  tend  to respond  sharply  to per  capita
income  increases  at low levels,  but respond  less  as incomes  rise.
Projections  using  constant-elasticity-demand  schedules  therefore  tend  to
over-estimate  income  responses.- 28  -
Table  6.1:  COMPENSATED  PRICE AND  EXPENDITURE  ELASTICITIES
(HOMOGENEITY  AND  SYMMETRY  IMPOSED)
Habit  Model  /a  No-Habit  Model
Price  Price  Price  Price
Coconut  Palm  Coconut Palm
Levels  at  Year  Oil  Oil  Expenditure  Oil  Oil  Expenditure
1970 Coconut  oil  -0.3  1.8  0.53  -0.3  2.3  0.60
Palm  oil  1.8  -13.3  4.09  2.3  -15.1  3.67
1980 Coconut  oil  -0.5  1.5  0.47  -0.6  1.8  0.54
Palm  oil  1.5  -5.1  2.68  1.8  -5.6  2.45
1985  Coconut  oil  -1.2  1.4  0.23  -1.4  1.6  0.33
Palm  oil  1.4  -1.6  1.86  1.6  -1.8  1.74
La  The  hypothesis  of habit-formation  cannot  be  rejected  at the  95Z  confidence
level.- 29 -
Supply
28.  The supply  of palm oil is modeled  using a vintage  capital  approach.
1/  As an oil palm tree  matures,  the  oil yield  of the tree  rises  from  zero in
the first three years to over 4.6 tons/hectare  by year eight.  The yield
remains  fairly  stable  for about  nine years thereafter  and then slowly  begins
to decline.  As the tree reaches its mid-twenties,  harvesting  becomes more
difficult  as the  tree  grows  taller. At some  point,  depending  upon  the  cost  of
labor and  the price of the oil, it becomes economically  advantageous  to
replant the tree--at  which point the yield drops to zero once more.  By
tracking  cohorts of newly planted  trees through  this life cycle,  a variable
representing  potential  production  can be calculated.
29.  While  the  potential production variable can  be  considered the
underlying capacity to  produce, actual production differs from potential
production  for economic  and biological  reasons.  On the  economic  side,  input
and output  prices  affect  a producer's  willingness  to supply--although  the
1/  See  Akiyama,  T. and  P. Trivedi  (1987).- 30 -
immediate  supply  response  is quite small.  1/  Biologically,  the  hybrid  trees
of Indonesia  exhibit  a cycle as well;  high yields  one year stress  the trees
and cause yields the following  year to drop.  To capture this effect,  the
lagged ratio  of  production to  potential production is  included as  an
explanatory  variable.
30.  As discussed  earlier,  area  devoted  to  coconut  production  has  expanded
steadily  with population.  A simple  linear  trend  explains  99%  of the  expansion
in coconut  area  over the  sample  period,  and  attempts  to introduce  lagged  price
vectors to explain past investment  decisions  proved unfruitful.  However,
coconut production  from planted area does respond to real prices through
harvesting  and marketing  intensification.  In the  model,  coconut  production  is
a  function  of harvested  area,  lagged  production,  and  real  prices.
31.  Once coconuts  have  been produced,  they can be used as fresh  nuts,  or
further processed into dried copra.  When regulations  allow,  copra can be
exported,  or further  crushed  into  meal  and  coconut  oil.  The  fresh  nuts  can  be
used  directly  as food,  or locally  processed  into  kelentic  oil.  The  demand  for
fresh fruit nuts is modeled as a  function  of the coconut oil price, real
income,  and the real  price  of rice.  The amount  of coconut  production  devoted
to the formal  copra sector  is calculated  as a residual,  i.e.,  the  difference
1/  Once  a plantation  is in operation,  producers  have little  leeway  in  most of
the  production  activities. Trees  that  are  not  maintained  are  subject  to
disease  and  certain  minimal  levels  of fertilizer  must be applied  to assure
future  production. Harvested  planting  material  is  used to fuel  processing
plants  so that  energy  costs  are  minimal  as well.  As a result,  the  high
fixed  costs  and  low  variable  costs  provide  a wide  range  over  which
producers  will supply.- 31 -
between coconut production (in copra equivalent)  and fresh use  (in copra
equivalent). Since copra  exports  are limited  by trade restrictions,  most of
the copra in the formal  sector  is converted  into coconut  oil, providing  the
model's  supply  of coconut  oil.
32.  Figure 6.1 shows the overall structure of the model and helps to
illustrate  some of the dynamics of the model behavior.  While production
decisions are bound by past investment  decisions for coconut  and oil palm
trees  and prices  are  dictated  by world  events,  relative  price  changes  do allow
for a wide range of behavior in demand and marketing.  On the demand  side
relative price changes alter both the allocation  of expenditures  between
vegetable  oils and other products  and between  palm oil and coconut  oil.  On
the supply  side  palm oil production  remains  relatively  insensitive  to prices,
but coconut prices do affect the allocation  of supplied  nuts to food/home
consumption  and  to  marketed copra supplies.  Given  the  simultaneity  of
consumption  and marketing  responses  in the domestic  vegetable  sector,  it is
important  to look  at the  entire  sector  when gauging  policy  effects.Figure  6.1:  Model  Flow  Chart
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VII.  MODEL  SCENARIOS  AND SIMULATION  RESULTS
33.  In order  to calculate  the effects  of certain  policy  changes  as well
as to quantify  the  revenues  generated  by a tax  on vegetable  oil exports  which
is under  consideration,  four  policy  scenarios  were  simulated  using  the  model.
Base Scenario:  Under this scenario,  the current  government  policy
of assessing  domestic  allocations  from producers  at set allocation
prices  below  world  market  prices  continues. Copra  exports  are still
banned, but the recent  policy of liberalizing  coconut  oil exports
remains  in  place.
Base and  Tax:  Indonesian  vegetable  oil  policies  continue  unchanged.
In addition  an export  tax  of 5% is imposed  on vegetable  oil  exports.
World  +  Tax:  Under  this  scenario, Indonesia dismantles its
vegetable  oil  allocation  system,  and  allows  unlimited  export  of both
crude and  refined vegetable oils.  Farm gate  prices rise  to
international  levels  minus  transportation  costs--about  25%  above  the
baseline  scenario  prices. At the  same time,  however,  the  government
imposes  a 5% export  tax  on the  oils.
World Prices: Under the  final  scenario,  trade  is fully  liberalized
without export taxes.  Domestic prices now  equal international
prices  minus transportation  costs.- 34 -
34.  In examining  the results  of the model  under the four scenarios,  one
result which quickly becomes obvious is that the demand and  supply of
vegetable  oils in Indonesia  have a momentum  which is difficult  to redirect.
While  demand  (Table  7.1)  is  responsive  to  prices,  population  growth  and income
chauges are extremely important  determinants  as well.  Stocks of existing
trees  mature  over a period  of several  years  and  have lives  spanning  decades.
Investments  made today  have minimal  effect  until the last  half of the 1990s.
Supplies  (Table  7.2)  of palm  oil and coconuts  do respond  to prices,  but these
responses  are slow to develop and are limited  by the underlying  productive
capacity  of the  mature  tree stock.
35.  The supply  response  of palm  oil under  the four scenarios  is straight
forward. The price  responsiveness  in  the short-run  is positive,  but small.
As  farm-gate prices rise  from the  Baseline scenario to  the  Export-tax
scenario, and  finally to  the world price scenario, supplies of palm oil
increase  as more inputs  are used and harvesting  becomes  more intensive  in
response  to greater profitability.  At the same time, however, investment
decisions from previous decades have dictated a potential limit to these
increases.  The supply response  of coconut  oil is similar  in direction  and
scale, but contains a  larger degree of simultaneity.  While palm oil is
quickly  processed  once the fruit  matures  and before  it spoils; with coconut
production there is an  alternative  use  which competes for mature nuts.
Harvested  nuts can  be retained  locally  or sold to processors. One option  for
home consumption is  the production of kelentic oil, which serves as an
alternative  to refined  coconut  oil.  As the price  of coconut  oil increases,  a
larger number  of  nuts  are  retained locally (Table  7.3),  leaving  a reducedTable  7.1:  INDOIESIAN  VEGETABLE  OILS: DOMESTIC  DEMAND,  HISTORIC  1987-1988,  SIMULATED  1989-2000
Domestic  Demand  CPO  Domestic  Demand  COO
Scenario  Scenario
Year  Baseline  Base  + Tax  World  + Tax  World  Price  Baseline  Base  + Tax  World  + Tax  World  Price
------------------------------------  (000  mt)--
1987  856  856.00  856.00  856.00  616.00  616.00  616.00  616.00
1988  924  924.00  924.00  924.00  591.00  591.00  591.00  591.00
1989  816  824.24  799.70  793.51  697.09  696.99  690.84  690.91
1990  954  963.51  936.51  929.58  694.23  693.85  687.73  688.01
1991  1,067  1,077.19  1,046.41  1,038.85  717.86  717.31  711.99  712.38
1992  1,186  1,197.61  1,162.49  1,154.25  744.66  743.92  739.59  740.11
1993  1,321  1,333.39  1,293.60  1,284.61  768.72  '67.76  764.51  765.19
1994  1,449  1,462.36  1,418.06  1,408.38  781.39  780.19  778.22  779.06
1995  1,588  1,601.96  1,552.72  1,542.29  794.0:  792.54  792.02  793.06
1996  1,754  1,769.51  1,715.29  1,703.98  795.55  793.73  794.59  795.87
1997  1,937  1,953.79  1,894.17  1,881.91  792.20  789.99  792.40  793.96
1998  2,136  2,154.30  2,088.81  2,075.51  785.12  782.47  786.65  788.52
1999  2,353  2,372.59  2,300.59  2,286.17  773.76  770.63  776.80  779.02
2000  2,597  2,618.90  2,539.81  2,524.12  759.46  775.76  764.21  766.82
Notes: CPO  - palm  oil;  CCO  - coconut  oil.Table  7.2:  INDONESIAN  VEGETABLE  OILS: DOIESTIC  SUPPLIES,  HISTORIC  1987-1988,
SIMULATED  1989-2000
Production  CPO  Production  CCO
Scenario  Scenario
World  World
Year  Baseline  Base  +  Tax  World  +  Tax  Price  Baseline  Base  +  Tax  World  +  Tax  Price
----------------------------------------------  (1000  Mt)  --------------------------------------------
1987  1,465  1,465  1,465  1,465  1,465  754  754  754
1988  1,698  1,698  1,698  1,698  1,698  803  803  803
1989  2,261  2,261  2,257  2,270  2,273  804  826  831
1990  2,491  2,491  2,488  2,500  2,502  872  893  898
1991  2,693  2,693  2,690  2,701  2,703  887  925  933  1
1992  2,835  2,835  2,832  2,843  2,845  935  969  978
1993  2,953  2,953  2,950  2,960  2,962  958  1,002  1,011
1994  3,069  3,069  3,067  3,076  3,089  999  1,042  1,052
1995  3,164  3,164  3,162  3,171  3,172  1,028  1,077  1,088
1996  3,244  3,244  3,241  3,250  3,252  1,067  1,117  1,128
1997  3,314  3.314  3,312  3,321  3,322  1,099  1,154  1,166
1998  3,384  3,384  3,382  3,390  3,391  1,136  1,191  1,203
1999  3,442  3,442  3,440  3,448  3,449  1,167  1,226  1,238
2000  3,493  3,493  3,491  3,499  3,500  1,202  1,262  1,275Table  7.3: COCONUT  PRODUXCTION  AND  USE: HISTORIC  1987-1988,  SIMULATED  1988-2000
(Copra  Equivalents)
Production  Coconuts (Copra  Eq.)  Coconuts,  other  use  Copra  Crush
Scenario  Scenario  Scenario
World  World  World  World  Base  World  World
Year  Baseline  Base  +  Tax  + Tax  Price  Baseline  Base  + Tax  + Tax  Price  Baseline  +  Tax  +  Tax  Price
1987  2,009  2,009  2,009  2,009  772  772  772  722  1,237  1,237  1,237  1,237
1988  1,974  1,969  1,987  1,991  724  715  750  757  1,317  1,317  1,317  1,317
1989  2,038  2,029  2,068  2,077  788  787  792  793  1,250  1,242  1,276  1,284
1990  2,123  2,109  2,167  2,179  769  763  787  791  1,353  1,347  1,379  1,388
1991  2,192  2,176  2,242  2,257  808  806  814  815  1,384  1,371  1,429  1,442
1992  2,258  2,241  2,313  2,329  802  797  815  818  1,456  1,444  1,498  1,511
1993  2,322  2,305  2,381  2,398  827  825  833  835  1,495  1,480  1,548  1,563
1994  2,386  2,368  2,448  2,466  827  824  838  840  1,559  1,544  1,611  1,626
1995  2,450  2,431  2,5-5  2,534  844  842  851  852  1,605  1,589  1,664  1,681
1996  2,513  2,493  2,582  2,601  847  844  855  857  1,666  1,650  1,727  1,744
1997  2,577  2,556  2,648  2,668  859  857  865  866  1,718  1,699  1,783  1,802
1999  2,637  2,616  2,711  2,731  863  860  870  871  1,774  1,755  1,841  1,860
1999  2,696  2,674  2,772  2,793  872  870  877  879  1,824  1,804  1,895  1,914
2000  2,755  2,733  2,832  2,854  876  874  882  883  1,878  1,858  1,950  1,971- 38  -
amount  of copra  available  for crushing.  As a result,  the supply  response  of
coconut  oil is more muted  than the overall  supply  response  of coconuts. With
significant  levels  of pr3.ce  increases,  the overwhelming  production  increases
allow  an increase  in both local consumption  and copra  crushing;  small price
increases  could  conceivably  lead  to a decline  in  cozonut  oil  supplies.
36.  As  noted earlier, policies in Indonesia have been effective in
lowering  farm-gate  prices  for producers,  thereby  guaranteeing  low input  costs
to processors;  but at the same time recent  consumer  prices  have ranged  above
prices  of comparable  vegetable  oils  in Europe. The large  margin  between  £arm-
gate and consumer  prices implies  either inefficiencies  or abnormally  large
profits  in the  processing  and distribution  network.  In either  case,  allowing
farm-gate prices to rise  to near-world-level  prices would do  little to
decrease  the margin.  Therefore,  it is assumed  under the model simulation,
that  increased  costs  to the  processors  will  be passed  on to consumers.
37.  On the supply  side,  the production  of palm oil is entrenched  by past
events, while coconut oil  supplies are more sensitive to prices due  to
alternative  uses for the fresh coconuts.  On the demand side, it is the
consumption  of palm oil which  appears  more price sensitive. As prices  fall,
consumers  are encouraged  to consider  both coconut  oil and palm  oil; however,
there  is  a secondary  effect  as well.  For  a given  level  of expenditures,  more
total  oil is affordable;  that is, the  consumer  has suffered  the  equivalent  of
an  income  1oss.  Palm  oil,  the  more  income elastic of  the  two,  is
disproportionately  influenced  by the  secondary  effect,  reinforcing  the  initial
price-effect.  This can best be seen with relatively  small price changes.- 39  -
Imposing  a 5Z export  tax lessens  domestic  prices  by a comparable  amount  since
traders  would receive  an equal  profit  by selling  domestically  or by exporting
only if the price spread between domestic  and export prices equalled the
export  tax.  Imposing  an export  tax on the  base line (and  therefore  reducing
domestic  prices  by 5X) causes  domestic  CPO  consumption  to jump  21,000  tons  by
the year 2000; imposing  an export  tax on the  world price  scenario  causes  CPO
consumption  to increase  by 15,800  tons  by 2000.
38.  Tables 7.4 to 7.6 provide  the commodity-detailed  results  for trade
under the four scenarios (Table 7.8 provides  summary  results for 1995 and
2000).  Trade liberalization  works to dampen demand and stimulate supply,
resulting  in substantial  gains  in  export  revenue. Moving  from  the  Baseline  to
World-Price  scenarios  increases  export  revenues  by $65  million  in 1995  and  $95
million  in 2000.  Liberalization  plus taxation  essentially  negate  these  gains
as export revenues  under the World +  Tax scenario  are quite close to the
Baseline  scenario.
39.  Table 7.7 shows  tax revenues  generated  under the two tax scenarios.
(These  are summarized  for 1995  and 2000 in  Table 7.8).  While  generating  $53
million in tax revenue,  adding  an export  tax to the Baseline  scenario  also
results in a  $70 million drop  in export revenues in 1995; this scheme
generates $47 million in tax revenue in 2000 but leads to a $70 million
decline in export  revenues  in that year.  Under  a trade  liberalization  with
export  tax scheme  $57  million  and  $52  million  are  generated  for  the  government
in 1995 and 2000, respectively;  however, export revenues decline by  $71
million  in each  year.  Since  the  Government of  Indonesia,  through  its  PTPsTable  7.4:  COCONUT  EXPORTS: HISTORIC  1987-88,  SIMULATED  1989-2000
Export  Quantity  COo  Export  S Value  OM
Scenario
Base  World  World  Base  World  World
Year  Baseline  + Tax  + Tax  Price  Baseline  + Tax  + Tax  Price
---------------- …  (000  mt)-----------------  ---------- (USS 1985 constant)----------
1987  118  118  118  118  49,796  47,306  47,306  49,796
1988  226  226  226  226  126,560  120,232  120,232  126,560
1989  112  107  135  140  65,004  58,885  74,193  81,109
1990  182  178  205  210  110,602  102,711  118,478  127,949
1991  178  170  213  221  113,178  102,720  128,472  140,418
1992  198  191  230  237  131,171  120,314  144,946  157,694
1993  199  190  237  246  137,912  125,228  156,063  170,630
1994  227  219  264  273  163,607  149,811  180,585  196,559
1995  245  235  285  295  183,336  167,500  202,732  220,816
1996  283  274  323  332  215,928  198,545  234,092  253,953
1997  319  309  361  372  248,990  229,330  267,835  290,078
1998  363  353  404  415  288,633  267,060  305,806  330,151
1999  406  397  449  459  329,673  305,789  345,907  372,668
2000  456  446  497  508  376,834  350,719  390,758  419,920Table  7.5:  PALM  OIL  EXPORTS
Export  Quantity  COP  Export  S Value  COP
Scenario
Base  World  World  Bease  World  World
Year  Baseline  +  Tax  *  Tax  Price  Baseline  *  Tax  +  Tax  Price
----------------  ('000  mt)-----------------  -------  ('000  USS 1985 constant)…--------
1987  531  531  531  531  170,982  162,433  162,433  170,982
t998  692  692  692  692  307,248  291,886  291,886  307,248
1989  1,445  1,433  1,470  1,479  608,429  573,179  588,018  622,679
1990  1,537  1,524  1,564  1,573  654,807  616,895  632,758  670,036
1991  1,626  1,611  1,654  1,664  734,864  692,368  710,386  752,189
1992  1,649  1,635  1,680  1,691  793,732  747,573  768,442  813,847
1993  1,632  1,617  1,667  1,678  833,311  784,348  808,519  856,660
1994  1,620  1,604  1,658  1,670  874,524  822,664  850,287  901,260
1995  1,576  1,560  1,618  1,630  901,688  847,480  879,224  932,470
1996  1,490  1,472  1,535  1,548  875,636  821,856  857,068  909,812
1997  1,378  1,358  1,427  1,440  831,462  778,914  817,997  869,426
198  1,248  1,227  1,301  1,316  772,907  722,207  765,580  815,069
1999  1,090  1,068  1,147  1,163  692,053  644,195  692,372  738,920
2000  896  872  959  976  583,034  539,253  592,939  635,297- 42 -
Table  7.6: TOTAL  EXPORT  REVENUE: HISTORIC  1987-88,
SIMULATED  1989-2000
--------- Total  Export  Revenue-------
----------------------- Scenario----------------------
Base  World  World
Year  Baseline  +  Tax  +  Tax  Price
---------------- ('000  US$  1985  constant)--------------
1987  220,778  209,739  209,739  220,778
1988  433,808  412,118  412,118  433,808
1989  673,433  632,064  662,211  703,787
1990  765,409  719,606  719,236  797,985
1991  848,042  795,089  838,858  892,607
1992  924,902  867,887  913,389  971,541
1993  971,223  909,576  964,582  1,027,289
1994  1,038,131  972,474  1,030,872  1,097,818
1995  1,085,024  1,014,980  1,081,956  1,153,286
1996  1,091,564  1,020,401  1,091,160  1,163,765
1997  1,080,452  1,008,244  1,085,832  1,159,505
1998  1,061,540  989,267  1,071,386  1,145,220
1999  1,021,726  949,984  1,038,279  1,111,588
2000  959,868  889,972  983,697  1,055,218Table  7.7:  TAX  REVENUES  GENERATED  BY VEGETABLE  OIL  EXPORT  TAX
('000  USS  1985  constant)
Tax  Revenue  CPO  Tax  Revenue  CCO
Scenario  Total  Revenues  from  Vegetable  Oil  Export  Tax
Year  Base  +  Tax  World  +  Tax  Base  +  Tax  World  +  Tax  Base  +  Tax  World  + Tax
1987  8,549  8,549  2,490  2,490  11,039  11,039
1988  15,362  15,362  6,328  6,328  21,690  21,690
1989  30,167  30,948  3,099  3,905  33,267  34,853
1990  32,468  33,303  5,406  6,236  37,874  39,539
1991  36,440  37,389  5,406  6,762  41,847  44,150
1992  39,346  40,444  6,332  7,629  45,678  48,073  1 1993  41,281  42,554  6,591  8,214  47,872  50,767  ; 1994  43,298  44,752  7,885  9,504  51,183  54,256
1995  44,604  46,275  8,816  10,670  53,420  56,945
1996  43,256  45,109  10,450  1i,321  53,705  57,429
1997  40,995  43,052  12,070  14,097  53,065  57,149
1998  38,011  40,294  14,056  16,095  52,067  56,389
1999  33,905  36,441  16,094  18,206  49,999  54,646
2000  28,382  31,207  18,459  20,566  46,841  51,774- 44 -
Table  7.8:  SUMMARY  OF TOTAL  EXPORT  REVENUE  AND  GOVERNMENT
REVENUE  FOR 1995  AND  2000
Export  Revenue  Government  Revenue
World  Baseline  World  Baseline  World
Year  Baseline  Price  and  Tax  and  Tax  and  Tax  and  Tax
(million  !985  $US)
1995  1,085  1,153  1,015  1,082  53  57
2000  960  1,055  890  984  47  52- 45 -
and PNP's, is a major producer  of palm oil, a portion of the lost export
revenues  also comes out of gavernment  coffers.  Hence, not only would an
export  tax prove relatively  costly  in terms  of lost export  revenue,  part of
the "gains"  in terms  of government  revenues  would come from  other  government
institutions.
Implications  for  Vegetable  Oil  MiLling
40.  Total  copra  milling capacity has  remained fairly  constant in
Indonesia  over the past decade,  although  ownership  of milling capacity  has
become  more concentrated.  In 1977,  415 firms had an estimated  capacity  of
1.66 million tons  (copra).  In 1985, 333  firms owned  1.98 million of
capacity. In 1975,  firms  averaged  a 51% utilization  rate.  In 1985,  the last
year for which data is available,  the industry  averaged  a 45% utilization
rate.  Firms have an  incentive to both over-invest (thereby increasing
processing  costs)  and to overstate  their  potential  capacity,  however,  for the
following  reasons.  Licenses  are  needed  in order  to expand  existing  plants  or
to build new plants.  In reviewing proposed  expansions,  the Ministry of
Industry  looks at existing  capacity  and future needs.  By over-investing,
existing  firms  prevent the  establishment of  new  competing firms;  by
overstating  their  capacity,  the  firms  accomplish  the same  goal  without  costs.
41.  While the location  of existing  milling plants is not ideal, there
appears  to be little  need for  increasing  capacity. Under  all three  scenarios,
copra crushings remain under 1.9 million tons.  In the near term, excess
capacity  will remain  near  current  levels.- 46 -
42.  In 1982,  25 plants  milled  palm oil  with a collective  capacity  of 794
tons of fresh fruit  bunches  per  hour.  By 1987,  capacity  had grown to 2,130
tons per hour.  Even assuming  an optimistic  extraction  rate of 20% for oil,
and plant  operations  of 450  hours/month,  existing  capacity  translates  into  1.9
million  tons of palm oil.  In addition,  since the acid content  of the ffb's
climbs  quickly  within  24 hours  of harvesting,  inter-shipments  of ffb's  among
processors  is usually  not feasible,  nor can processing  be  delayed  during  peak
production  months.  Production  of CPO in Indonesia  will problably  exceed  two
million  tons in 1989.  The need for  rapid  expansion  of CPO  milling  plants  is
crucial  and the possibility  of local shortages  in milling  capacity  are real.
At least  one government  estate  is currently  shipping  ffb's  over 60 kilometers
of bad roads because  of lack of adequate  milling.  Ten more milling plants
with a total capacity  of 300 ffb tons/hour  are scheduled  for completion  in
1988/89,  five of which are supported  by World Bank and ADB loans.  During
Repelita  V which  ends in 1994,  an additional  34 milling  plants  with 1,030  tons
of capacity  are scheduled  for  construction.  This  does  not 'nclude  new private
milling capacity  for either existing  estates,  or estates started  under the
Pir-Trans  scheme.
43.  The need for rapid  expansion  of milling  capacity  is well understood
in  Indonesia,  and  the  schedule of  new  plant  construction  addresses the
problem.  At the same time, however,  new milling plants  require  one or two
years  to  construct in  Indonesiat and  government and  PTP  resources are
currently  quite stretched.  Slippage in meeting the construction  schedule
would result  in local  capacity  shortages  by the  early 1990s  and  the  potential
waste  of production  gains  by  existing  oil palm  plantings.47 -
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS
44.  The production  and consumption  of vegetable  oils in Indonesia  have
bean growing  rapidly  and  will continue  to grow rapidly  through  the  end  of the
century. Domestic  demand,  driven  by income  and  population  growth  is projected
to increase  from 856,000  tons of CPO  nad  616,000  tons  of CCO in 1987,  to 2.6
million tons of CPO and 760,000  tons of CCO in 2000.  Production  will expand
rapidly  as well,  with CPO production  growing  from 1.5  million  tons in 1987  to
3.5 million tons in 2000.  Coconut oil production  will grow as well, from
754,000  tons in 1987  to 1.2  million  tons int  2000.  Past  gains  have come  amid  a
complex  collection  of government  interventions  in the vegetable  oils  market,
which have both encouraged  production  through  direct  investment  in palm oil
and  indirect  assistance to the private sector, and discouraged  production
through a  system  of  allocation prices  which  lower  average  farm-gate
receipts.  Consumers  do not appear to have benefited  from lowered  farm-gate
prices, with most of  the benefits going to processors  and  distributors.
Policy simulations show that  removing duch cumbersome regulations  would
stimulate  production,  but would  not guarantee  consumer  benefits. Regardless
of the policy scenario  evaluated,  past investments  in tree crops guarantee
rapid future production  expansion.  However,  this increased  production  will
not confer market-making  power on Indonesian  producers,  since as tree-crop
producers, they are unable to adjust supplies  quickly as do suppliers of
vegetable  oil from annual crops.  The rapid expansion  of vegetable  oil may
precipitate  a domestic  crisis  in  the  palm  oil  milling  industry. While  current- £8e  -
excess  capacity  for copra  milling  can easily  absorb  the projected  production
gains,  palm  oil  milling  capacity  is stretched. New investments  in  milling  are
planned by the private sector and  the Ministry of Industry.  Should the
investments  fail to materialize,  some future  production  gains from existing
trees  will be squandered.
45.  In a country  with  a developing  infrastructure  and large  social  needs,
government financing issues take on  special significance.  However, the
results  of the model demonstrate  that an export  tax on vegetable  oils would
prove  quite  costly  in terms  of export  revenues,  with tax  revenue  gains  of $5O-
60  million annually resulting in  substantially  larger drops  in  export
revenues.  In addition,  a portion  of the gains in tax revenues  will come at
the  expense of  revenues generated by  state-owned estates,  essentially
transferring  revenues  from one  government  institution  to another  and reducing
further  the  gains  from  an export  tax.- 49  -
Annex  A:  Palm  Oil and  the  Larger  Market  for  Vegetable  Oils
46.  Generally  speaking,  any vegetable  oil can be used in cooking and,
therefore,  the potential  for a wide range  of substitution  exists.  However,
vegetable  oils  in their  natural  state  have  a number  of unique  characteristics,
such as flavor,  aroma,  the smoking-point  of the oil, and dietary  differences
in vitamin  and saturated-fat  content.  Consumption  of pure vegetable  oils is
often heavily influenced  by traditional  cooking  techniques  and cuisine  which
necessarily  increases  the differentiation  among  vegetable  oils.  At the same
time, a  great deal of vegetable oil  consumption  comes in a  more highly
processed form, and it  is at  this level that substitution  possibilities
abound.  Chemically,  different  vegetable  oils are distinguished  primarily  by
the  dominant type  of  fatty-acid contained in  the  oil.  The  chemical
composition  determines  physical  characteristics  such as smelting  and smoking
points.  Saturated  fats tend  to have a higher  melting  point  and  are  naturally
solid at room temperature.  Lauric oils have a "sudsing"  capacity  and are
often  used in  detergents,  shampoos  and soaps. However,  all vegetable  oils  are
in fact  composed  of several  fatty-acids  and, when processed,  these  fatty-acid
chains  can be separated  and  or otherwise  altered  to yield  building  blocks  for
processed  products.  For example,  soybean  oil, which is normally  liquid  at
room temperature,  can be hydrogenated  and combined  with other products to
yield  either  margarine,  a butter  substitute,  or vanaspati,  a lard substitute--
both of which are solid  at room temperature. Sometimes,  as in the case in
margarine  production,  the chemical  structure  of the oil is altered,  while in
other  cases,  the  changes  are  cosmetic. Palm oil,  which is  naturally  a bright- 50 -
orange,  is routinely  bleached  and deodorized. Many products  can be made from
a  variety of vegetable oil sources using different chemical recipes, but
yielding  products  which  are indistinguishable  in terms  of taste,  colbr,  aroma,
and  other  cooking  characteristics.
47.  This  high  level  of  technically-feasible  substitution appears
economically  feasible  as well--that  is,  while there  are costs  associated  with
"recipe-changing",  processors  will switch  formulas  as market  prices  change.
The strongest  evidence  for this economic-substitution  is given by the high
level  of correlation  among  prices  (Table  A.1).  Recalling  from  Table 2.1 the
tremendous  variety  in vegetable  oil sources,  it is easy  to see  how differing
supply  shocks  can enter  the  vegetable  oil  market  independently. Agricultural
policy changes in North America are most likely independent  of rainfall  in
Malaysia,  or exchange  rate policy  in Brazil,  and yet, despite  the  variety  and
evolution of supply conditions in the world, prices among vegetable oils
remain highly correlated, indicating that substitution  in demand largely
compensates  for  shocks to  supply.  It is  interesting  to note that the
correlation  between  coconut  oil  and palm  kernel  oil,  which  have similar  demand
characteristics,  is greater than that between palm oil and palm kernel oil
which  are contained  in  the same  fruit.
48.  Even if the  market  were more limited,  giving  Indonesia  a significant
market  share,  producers  or their  agents  would  have  a difficult  time  exercising
any monopoly  power.  Indonesia  proauces  its  vegetable  oils from tree  crops  in
a market  dominated  by annual  crops.  Except  through  short-termy  stock  buildup,
the  only feasible  adjustment  is  through  planting  new trees--which  begin  to- 51 -
Table A.l:  PEARSON CORRELATION  COEFFICIENTS  FOR SELECTED
VEGETABLE OIL PRICES
Palm
Soy  Palm  Coconut  Rapeseed  Groundnut  Kernel
Oil  Oil  Oil  Oil  Oil  Oil
Soy Oil  1.00  0.96  0.87  0.99  0.95  0.91
Palm Oil  1.96  1.00  0.91  0.97  0.95  0.95
Coconut Oil  0.87  0.91  1.00  0.88  0.80  0.99
Rapeseed Oil  0.99  0.97  0.88  1.00  0.95  0.92
Groundnut Oil  0.95  0.95  0.80  0.95  1.00  0.86
Palm Kernel Oil  0.91  0.95  0.99  0.92  0.86  1.00
Note:  Prices are C.I.F.  Rotterdam, 1960-1988.  All coefficients  were
significant  at a 99% confidence  level.- 52  -
produce  after  four years--or  by slowly  depreciating  existing  stands  of trees.
Adjustments in  annual  crop  production can  occur  within a  year  on  an
overwhelming  scale.  Even weather-related  or other  natural  events  would  most
likely  swamp  adjustments  from Indonesia.  For example,  in 1988,  a drought  in
North  America  caused  US soybean  production  to drop by nearly  11 million  tons
which was equivalent  to a 2.26 million ton decline in world vegetable  oil
supplies--more than  one-and-a-half times  Indonesia's annual  palm  oil
production.
49.  The World  Bank's  multi-country  model  of the  vegetable  oil sector  was
used to validate the notion of Indonesia  as a  price taker in the world
vegetable  oil  market.  1/  Initial  model  results  were compared  to  a simulation
in which  Indonesia's  potential palm oil  and  coconut oil  production  was
increased  by 33%.  As can be seen in  Table  A.2, the  impact  of extremely  large
changes  in domestic  production  in Indonesia  quickly  become  dispersed  and  muted
in a global  context.  In fact, the table  conveys  a false sense  of accuracy
given  the  small  impact  of the scenario  change,  as none  of the  reported  changes
were significantly  different  from  zero  given  the forecasting  error  associated
with the  projections.
1/  The  multi-country  model  is described  in "A Global  Vegetable  Oils and  Meals
Model",  currently  in draft  form.- 53 -
Table A.2:  IMPACT  OF 33Z INCREASE  IN PALM OIL AND COCONUT OIL
PRODUCTION  IN INDONESIA
(Z  change)
Real Price
Year  Palm Oil  Coconut  Oil  Soybean
1990  -0.02  0.00  -0.01
1995  -0.98  -0.01  0.00
2000  -3.10  -0.88  -0.40
Production
Malaysian Palm Oil  World Coconut  Oil  World Soybean
1990  0.00  0.00  0.0
1995  -0.02  -.002  0.0
2000  -11.40  -0.340  -0.59- 54  -
Annex  B:  The  Almost  Ideal  Demand  System
50.  Deaton  and Muellbauer's  Almost Ideal Demand  System  begins  with the
following  expenditure  function:
log  c(u,  p)  =  a(p)  + ub(p)  (1)
where,
a(p) = a  +  Ek  log  p  + ½  £y  log  p log  p,  (2)
o  k  k  k m  km  k  m
b(p) =  B wp k,  (3)
0
k
pk are  prices,  u  is utility  and a, B and  y  are parameters.
51.  Substituting  (2)  and (3)  into  (1)  and  noting  that  alog  c/a log
Pi=  wi the  expenditure  share  is  given  by
w  = a  +  *  y  log  p  + B,log  (x/P)  (4)
i  i  j  ii  1  I
where  P is the  price  index:
log  P  = a  + Eak  logP  *  z  Y  log  p  log  p  (5)
o  k  k  kpm  km  k  m
Alternatively  the  price  index  can  be approximated  using  Stone's  index:- 55  -
log P  =  Pw  log  (P)  (6)
Using (4) and (6), theoretical  restructures  can be applied  in the following
way:
Adding  up requires,  for  all j,
E  a  = 1,  0  = 0, x  y  =0.  (7)
k  k  k  k  kj
Homogeneity  is satisfied  if and  only if,  for  all  j,
y  =0,  (8)
k  jk
while symmetry  is satisfied  provided
Y..  ~  Y..*  (9)
i  j  j  i
Manser  (1976)  provides  a test  for  habit  formation. Let
a  a. + dq  ,  (10)
1  1  I  it-l
where q is per capita consumption  of good i, and  ai.  di are parameters.
Substituting  (10) into (4) yields the habit-model.  Imposing  the adding-up
condition  on the  resulting  habit  model  requires.
E  (a  + d )  =1  (11)
i  IAnh  Table  Cl:  L1Sr  OF  ML, PARAth2  EST  AND  lESI  SMATISTICS
MCAP4EXP(LIlAP);
FR1Tl'N960-F  (DIFMNJ);
KW-aSa  TF/lOOND;F PCOD=PcCR*E,XU  RE/1000DIFO)  ;
POPJ..PRO1DMERATE/I1OODOIFUDP
RPoDpPaPJ/cPI  ;
PDC-  K(LuD9CFO)+  o;
RPCP=CPO/CPI*100
RFCCIhPC0/CPI*100;
EAPQ)PDrX i~  PCDJ;% 
UCO-WCDh'  /REOO*POP;
UXYRESHaOrXAP/RPOP;
P(RP(I  D)* HLpC)G(RPCPO)*SHcO,
TEUwrxcp*po
SHOOW  Al4GI  P*LOG(RPOOD)+(O-G1  1)*UEG(RPCPO)+B*(LOG(TXCAP)-SAR);
Gl  1. -0.06331(-1.1)  Al-  1.67(16.85)  BI:  -0.5119(-8.32)  t'
SHCFOM=(1-A1)+(O-G1_  )*IXXRPCOD)tG2  2*LOG(RRPCO)+(OBl)*  (UG(TXCAP>-PSTAR);
Al:  1.67(16.85)  GI_1: -0.06331(-I.I)  G2 2:  -0.06333(-1.1)  BI:  -0.5119(-8.32)
PDOPDOD 0+PDO  1IPCR;
PDOI:  0.63%(17.7)  PDOC)  0:  -32.2(-0.93)
U.PVXF=  PIJa*  OWPU 1*(pPCrT+pJp 2*(LAG(LLPDCPO/PPOT))  +PDCP  3*LAG2(LOG(RPCPO));
PDCFP1:  -0.0003373(-14.27)  PDCP  0:8.641(194.46)  PDCR_2:  -0.06118(-O.1)  PDCP  3:  -0.02238(-2.52)
PDC(XPDOC  O+PDOC  1*HADP+IXDOC  2*LAG2(RPCO)+fPDOC  3*LAG(PDOCN);
PDOCXl:  0.3821(3.68)  PDOC  0:  168.7(0.68)  PDCC  2:  1.4(1.21)  PDCC  3:  0.2176(0.91)
DI1TD1:OIFN  O+DI_  1MI)G(RPI  D)+DIFN  2*qLG(RPRICE)4DIFN  3* LOG(RYCAP)+DIFN  4*LAG(DIFNT>.+DIFN  5*D1;
DIFi 1:  -O.2623(-0.43)  DIFN  0:  4.349(1.7)  DIMFi2:  0.6575(0.68)  DIFN  3:  -2.888(-4.58)
DIRF_4:  -0.809(-10.33)  DIFN5: -3.969(-10.81)
LNMnPnU4cXDLaG(RPRICE)+T)h2PSrAR!1X3*WG(RYCAP);
TXI: -0.4797(-2.03)  MXD:  6.296(9.19)  TX2: 0.9169(6.62)  1X3:  1.483(9.09)
HAM))  Al*YEAR;
HACI:  91.24(51.5)  HA:  -177989(-50.77)Annex  Table C2:  MLM  S  SR  SrATISITcS;  NOINEAR  SUR  s9MMARY  oF RESIDUAL  ERRoRS
Degree  of  Freedom
Equation  MDdel  Error  SSE  HE  Root NEE  R-Square  Label
SHCPO  2.5  11.5  0.04267  .00371036  0.06091  0.8677  Expenditure  share,  CPO
SHOCO  1.5  12.5  0.04266  .00341312  0.05842  0.8677  Expenditure  share,  CC0
PDCCO  2  12  9606.51  800.54  28.29386  0.9137  Production  COX  ('000  tons)
LLPDCPO  4  10  .00047438  4.74E-05  0.0068875  0.9935  Log of  production  COP  variable
DIFNUT  6  8  0.83206  0.10401  0.32250  0.9639  Log of  fresh  use  variable,  coconuts
L¶XCAP  4  10  0.08385  .00838458  0.09157  0.8656  Log  total  oil  expenditures  per  capita
PDCCN  4  10  56339.12  5633.91  75.05939  0.8846  Production  coconuts  (copra  eq.  -000  ton)
HASDP  2  12  15170.49  1264.21  35.55570  0.9918  Area copra  (-000  ha)
Un- 58  -
Anrex Table  C.3:  NON-LINEAR  SUR  PARAETE ESlIMAIES
Approximate  fort  Approxmate
Parameter  Estimate  SI)  Error  Ratio  Proli>[T]
Al  1.66961  0.09907  16.85  0.0001
PDOO  0  -32.20385  34.69638  -0.93  0.3716
PDOD  1  0.63964  0.03615  17.70  0.0001
PDCP  O  8.64081  0.04444  194.46  0.0001
PDCP  1  -3.37E-04  2.36E-05  -14.27  0.0001
PDCP  2  -0.06118  0.62815  -0.10  0.9243
PDCP  3  -0.02238  0.0088682  -2.52  0.0302
PDOC  O  168.74  247.87  0.68  0.5115
PDCC  1  0.38214  0.10392  3.68  0.0043
PDOC2  1.39983  1.15591  1.21  0.2537
PDXC-3  0.21764  0.24043  0.91  0.3866
GI  1  -0.06331  0.05764  -1.10  0.2936
Bi  -0.51195  0.06151  -8.32  0.0001
DIFN 0  4.34948  2.55968  1.70  0.1277
DIFN 1  -0.26228  0.60695  -0.43  0.6771
DIFN 2  0.65751  0.97202  0.68  0.5178
DIFN 3  -2.88800  0.63010  -4.58  0.0018
DIFN 4  -0.80899  0.07829  -10.33  0.0001
DIFN 5  -3.96920  0.36715  -10.81  0.0001
G2  2  -0.06333  0.05764  -1.10  0.2954
TXO  6.684%  0.68496  9.19  0.0001
TX1  -0.47974  0.23660  -2.03  0.0701
TX2  0.91692  0.13854  6.62  0.0001
1X3  1.48341  0.16311  9.09  0.0001
HALD  -177989  3505.65  -50.77  0.0001
HACI  91.24258  1.77185  51.50  0.0001Annex Table  C4:  DESCRIPrVE  SAIISTICS  FOR  MODEL  VALMDATION;  ACIUAL  AND  DYNAMIC  SDMULAIION  RESULTS
ACTIAL  PREDICTED
Variable  NOBS  N  MEAN  SID  MEAN  SID  LATL
EXQXD  14  14  28.0357  49.3738  17.9611  37.2069  Export  quantity  cco
FRNUT  14  14  629.5  153.0  645.4  139.4  Fresh  nut  use,  copra  eq.
EXQCPO  14  14  334.9  113.2  338.2  163.1  Export  quantity  cpo
DUCOD  14  14  546.8  81.5090  547.6  62.8039  Domestic util.  cco
DUCPO  14  14  283.1  286.3  279.8  271.8  Domestic  util.  cpo
PSTAR1  14  14  4.1747  0.2299  4.1759  0.2326  Aggregate  price  index,  oils
IEXP  14  14  51916.7  15491.4  51953.3  15163.7  Total  expenditures  on  veg.  oil
PXOD  14  14  341.7  212.1  341.7  212.1  EUbestic  retail  price  cco  Rp/kilo
P&PO  14  14  251.1  98.0566  251.1  98.0566  Dom^estic  price  cpo  in  Rp.  I RPCPO  14  14  59.5992  21.7955  59.5992  21.7955  Deflated  cpo  price  (world)  un
RPCOD  14  14  72.1345  17.6411  72J1345  17.6411  Deflated  cco  price  (world)
PODPJ  14  14  234.2  118.2  234.2  118.2  Price  copra  Java'(nom.  Rps)
PDCPO  14  14  651.1  319.9  650.9  320.7  Production  palm  oil  ('000  tons)
IXCAP  14  14  368.9  81.5856  369.7  82.2421  Total  veg.  oil  expend/cap
COPoR  14  14  936.7  137.0  922.5  86.1624  Copra  cnrsh
RP(OP  14  14  0.5210  0.1590  0.5210  0.1590  Real  price  copra,  S.  Sulawesi
PUOCN  14  14  1566.2  193.8  1567.9  172.5  Production  coconuts  (copra  eq.)
LLPDCYO  14  14  8.3751  0.0752  8.3751  0.0755  Log  of  production  cop  variable
PD!OM  14  14  567.0  92.5518  557.8  55.1129  Production  cco  ('000  tons)
5HCC  14  14  0.7778  0.1575  0.7784  0.1437  Expenditure  share  cco
SHCPO  14  14  0.2222  0.1575  0.2215  0.1437  Expenditure  share  cpo
LTXCAP  14  14  5.8883  0.2190  5.8898  0.222  Ing  total  oil  expenditures/cap
DIFNUT  14  14  5.4574  1.3314  5.4526  1.2226  Log  of  fresh  coconut  use  variable
HACOP  14  14  2534.6  377.6  2534.8  381.7  Area  copra  (t00O  ha)Annex Table  C5: VALIDAIION  STATISTICS  FOR  DYNAMIC  MODEL  SDMULATION,  1972-1985
MSE  DEoX!4poSITION  PROPORTIONS  INEQUALrIY  COEF
Variable  N  BIAS  REG  DIST  VAR  (0VAR  Ul  U  LABEL
(UM)  (UR)  (UD)  (UC)
EX4CC0  14  0.022  0.529  0.449  0.030  0.948  1.2321 0.7138  export  quantity  COO
FRNUT  14  0.036  0.019  0.945 0.024  0.94C  0.1301 0.0644  Fresh  nut  use,  copra,  eq.
EKQCPO  14  0.002  0.598  0.401 0.389  0.609  0.2188 0.1063  Export  quantity  CPO
DUCCO  14  0.000  0.001  0.999 0.119  0.881  0.0945 0.0473  Doenstic  util.  CCO
DUCRO  14  0.003  0.008  0.990 0.044  0.954  0.1695 0.0861  Domestic  util.  C(O
PSTAR  14  0.007  0.051  0.942 0.038  0.954  0.0033 0.0016  Aggregate  price  index,  oils
TYXP  14  O.000' 0.001  0.999 0.008  0.992  0.0662 0.0331  Aggregate  oil  expenditures
PDCPO  14  0.000  0.005  1.995 0.001  0.999  0.0358 0.0179  Production  palm  oil  o
TKCAP  14  0.001  0.036  0.963  0.001  0.999  0.0693 0.0346  Total  vegetable  oil  expend/cap
CUPCR  14  0.030  0.081  0.890 0.351  0.619  0.0874 0.0442  Copra  crush
PDCCN  14  0.001  0.013  0.986 0.091  0.909  0.0433 0.0216  Production  coconits
LLPDCPO  14  0.000  0.008  1.992 0.002  0.998  0.0007 0.0003  Log  of  production  CPO  variable
PD(OX  14  0.022  0.041  0.937 0.336  0.642  0.1084 0.0549  Production  C0X
SHiCX  14  0.000  0.016  0.984 0.080  0.920  0.0596 0.0298  Share  of  oil  expnediture,  COX
SHMCP  14  0.000  0.016  0.984  0.080  0.920  0.1755 0.0890  Share  of  oil  expenditure,  CPO
LTXCAP  14  0.000  0.046  0.954 0.002  0.998  0.0126 0.0063  Log  total  oil  expenditures/CAP
DIFNITf  14  0.000  0.037  0.963 0.101  0.899  0.0589 0.0295  Log of  fresh  use  variable
HA0  P  14  0.000  0.027  0.973  0.014  0.986  0.0129 0.0064  Area  copra- 61 -
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